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On the optimal realignment of a contest: The case of college football 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between demand and scheduling in college football. We 
first derive two different metrics for team quality, and then use those metrics to see how they 
impact attendance. We find that there is a positive interaction between the quality of the 
teams. Then various simulations are run to see how attendance would change under different 
scheduling scenarios. If teams are put into conferences based on the team quality measures, 
the average per game attendance only rises 1% to 2%. This is true if one year or ten year 
quality measures are used. However, our simulation suggests that this effect would be more 
than offset, mainly because schools with larger capacity would play fewer home games and 
so aggregate attendance would fall. We discuss whether this effect would be mitigated by 
capacity adjustments in the longer term. 
1 The Question 
The production of team sports involves a form of matching. In most professional leagues the 
membership is fixed and there is no choice in the selection of matches (the most common 
format of a league is a round robin where every team plays every other team twice, once at 
home and once away). College football is rather different. Teams belong to conferences and 
are usually required to schedule a certain number of games against conference rivals, but they 
are also free to schedule additional games against opposition of their choice. Moreover, the 
membership of conferences has always been fluid, and is going through a period of rapid 
change at the moment. According to Wikipedia 93 schools have jumped to a new conference 
(full membership) since 2010.1 
The aim of this paper is to develop a model for optimally matching college football teams in 
competition. Our notion of optimal matching is very simple, not unlike Becker’s (1973) 
theory of marriage. Each team has a productivity (team quality), Zi, which they bring to any 
match. The productivity of a match is the sum of individual productivities plus the interaction 
of the two: ±iZi + ² iZj + ³ iZiZi. This productivity then determines demand: the number of 
people who are willing to pay to watch the game. 
One interpretation of the interaction term is that it represents the demand for competitive 
balance (³ i > 0), which has long been considered by economists to be an important 
determinant of the demand for team sports (see e.g. Borland and McDonald (2003)). This 
element alone suggests that positive assortative matching is optimal - attendance is 
maximized globally when teams of similar quality play against each other. However, even if 
this is not true, positive assortative matching may still be optimal for individual teams (² i > 0 
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and ³ i = 0). Under this assumption, if the home team retains all the gate money it will be 
revenue maximizing to play the best opponents. 
There are two potential confounding factors in this analysis. First, there is the phenomenon of 
“rivalry games” - match-ups between teams that are deemed to be of historical significance in 
their own right, e,g, Michigan/Ohio State, Alabama/Auburn, etc. Typically these rivals are 
also geographically close. Often these rivals are well matched, but it may be that even when 
they are not well matched demand remains high. The second confounding factor relates to 
stadium capacity. Designing an attendance maximizing schedule will typically mean 
scheduling more games in the stadiums with the largest capacity. If these stadiums are homes 
of the strongest teams, then more positive assortative matching can actually reduce 
attendance: if two strong teams with large stadiums play each other, by implication one large 
stadium goes empty that day.2 In our analysis we find that rivalry games have a statistically 
significant positive effect on demand, but that this does not have a large effect on aggregate 
attendance. However, we do find that capacity effects are larger. 
In this paper we use the terms ”optimal” and ”attendance maximizing” interchangeably. Of 
course, it can be argued that what is optimal for a team involves more than attendance 
considerations. Strong teams scheduling games against weak teams might thereby improve 
their end of the season ranking. The impact on demand is not clear, since fans might not want 
to go to watch such games, but winning these games might increase demand later in the 
season due to their higher winning percentage. 
We develop a simple empirical model to analyze these issues. Based on a sample of college 
football games we estimate attendance as a function of various observables including the 
quality of the teams. We then identify the attendance maximizing conference structure, which 
matches teams of roughly equal quality across the season, and calculate the expected 
attendance conditional on this structure. Our results show that the attendance maximizing 
scheduling would increase per game attendance by an average of 1.5%. We conjecture that 
TV audiences are more sensitive to quality, so that the revenue benefits through TV would be 
even greater.3 However, this increase in demand is not enough to offset the stadium capacity 
effect identified above. In our balanced schedule the fact that all teams must then play half of 
their games on the road will imply that some larger stadiums will go empty and therefore 
total attendance would be smaller. We argue that this result is a consequence of current 
capacity constraints which are a product of the existing scheduling arrangements, and that in 
the longer term capacity would adjust to a revised scheduling scheme and so mitigate this 
effect. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
The next section gives some background on the economics of scheduling in college football. 
Section 3 describes our data and methodology, then we consider the results of the estimation 
in Section 4. Section 5 describes the simulated conference structure, and section 6 concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Matching Model 
College football resembles a marriage market in the sense that each game played requires that 
both sides agree to play, and both have many alternatives from whom to choose. Surprisingly 
little has been written in the academic literature on this problem. In most team sports this 
problem is trivial because competition is organized on a league basis and opponents are 
dictated by the system adopted. For instance, the NFL has formula which requires each team 
to play two games against each of their divisional rivals, divisional rivals have fourteen out of 
sixteen games against common opponents, while the remaining two are decided by the 
standings of the previous season. College football, while also being built around league play, 
gives far more latitude to teams to decide who they play. For example, in the Big 10 teams 
currently have to play 8 conference games in the season, five against members of their own 
division, two against teams from the other division (on a rotating basis) and one that it plays 
every year. However, teams play a 12 game season and are at liberty to play any four teams 
that will agree to play with them. Teams are also allowed to schedule a majority of their 
games at their home stadium, provided other teams agree to play there. Moreover, while most 
popular sports leagues are stable over time, college football is subject to realignment, 
markedly so in recent years. Colleges are seeking out the best collection of competitors that 
they can find. 
Matching theory suggests there should be few problems in finding optimal matches. Even in 
the absence of a pricing mechanism there are well known theorems, e.g. Gale and Shapley 
(1962), which suggest that optimal matches are feasible. Their model of a marriage market 
works via the ”deferred acceptance mechanism” - one gender makes offers to as many 
partners as they wish and the other rejects all offers but one which is held, and then a second 
round of offers is made conditional on (deferred) acceptances received, and the process 
repeats until no new offers are received. This mechanism has the nice property that at 
equilibrium no one fails to make a match with someone that (a) they would prefer and (b) 
would also prefer switch their match. This is consistent with positive assortative matching, 
where each agent has a type, and matches are made between similar types. Becker (1973) 
shows that positive assortative mating is an equilibrium in a marriage market which ensures 
that aggregate output from matches is maximized. The idea of positive assortative matching 
has been applied to explaining the distribution of wages (Sattinger 1993) and economic 
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development (Kremer 1993). In general, frictions may exist which prevent efficient 
assortative matching, while incomplete information and moral hazard my lead to inefficient 
matching (see e.g. Legros and Newman (2002)). For example, Fréchette et al. (2007) show 
that when college football bowl games were scheduled later in the season with more 
information about the quality of the teams, it is possible to match teams more evenly and 
efficiencies were gained as evidenced by higher television ratings. 
One difficulty in identifying optimal matches for college football teams is that the objectives 
of each college are not clear. We will assume that an optimal schedule is one that maximizes 
total output which we will measure by total attendance. This will also imply that the schedule 
maximizes the total attendance of each team, subject to playing a schedule of 5, 6, 7, or 8 
home games. However, decision makers within the college may have different objectives. 
Coaches will want a schedule which maximizes the probability of reaching the best possible 
Bowl game, Athletic Directors may want to maximize the resources provided the department, 
which might depend on meeting the demands of particular constituencies (e.g. the preferences 
of boosters) and University Presidents may have strategic goals which go beyond sport and 
relate to student recruitment, college profile and donors. This list of decision makers is not 
necessarily exhaustive. 
However, we do not believe that these objectives are widely at variance with output 
maximization as we have defined it. First, the rating schemes which determine the allocation 
of teams to Bowl games tend to favor those teams that play stronger schedules, all else equal, 
and so deliberately choosing a weak schedule can be counter-productive (Keener (1993)). 
Second, there are studies which have shown that successful athletic programs, especially in 
the revenue sports, tend to align with broader academic goals such as recruitment and 
donations.4 
2.2 Matching and the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
With the exception of Fréchette (2007), the sports literature has not focused on the matching 
issue for the reasons given above. However, it has focused on a related concept - the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (the original article in this literature is Rottenberg (1956)). 
In our terms, this asserts that a match will be more attractive (larger attendance) if the 
strength of the two sides is closely matched than if they are unevenly matched. This question 
has generated a large literature which has been surprisingly inconclusive. Thus a survey by 
McDonald and Borland (2003) found: 
”Of 18 studies identified, only about three provide strong evidence of an effect on attendance. 
Other studies provide mixed evidence that suggests a negative effect on attendance of 
increasing home win probability only when that win probability is above about two thirds. 
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The majority of studies find either that there is no significant relation between difference in 
team performance and attendance, or more directly contradictory, that attendance is 
monotonically increasing in the probability of a home-team win.” 
We have reviewed 15 studies published since then and the results are shown in Table 1. 
There is some variability in the focus of these studies, but generally they test for the effect on 
demand of the quality of the home team, the quality of the away team, and the expected 
difference in performance of the two teams. Quality is typically measured either by the recent 
winning records of the teams or by the pre-match betting odds on the teams. Almost all of the 
studies find that demand is increasing in the quality of the home team. When tested for, it is 
generally found that demand is also increasing in the quality of the away team (in the words 
of Coates and Humphreys (2010) ”fans want to see good teams play”). The results for the 
competitive balance measures are generally more ambiguous, in the line with the earlier 
research. Several studies suggest that the optimal winning percentage/probability of winning 
for the home team is in the region of 66%. Seen from our perspective the ambiguity is 
perhaps not surprising. If demand is increasing in qualities of the teams taken separately and 
in their interaction as well, then picking up the latter effect is likely to be difficult 
econometrically. 
Measures of differences in team quality, whether based on win/loss records or betting odds 
fail to generate a consistent pattern, are sometimes perversely signed, and often entail 
quadratic terms with impossible implications. For example, a finding that demand is 
decreasing in both the absolute difference in win loss records and its square would normally 
be taken as confirmation of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. However, the implication 
of this is that a very weak home team playing against a very strong home team could face 
negative demand. 
In our model, based on our discussion of assortative matching and Becker’s marriage model, 
we view the value of the match as dependent on both the qualities of the home and away 
teams taken separately and the product of the two qualities. Thus at worst a highly 
unbalanced match could contribute nothing to demand other than the quality of the strong 
team. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Team Quality Measures 
Our first step is to measure team quality. Football Bowl Subdivision games were used to 
create team quality variables. Our sample consists of 14,924 games played between 1990 and 
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2010. However, since lagged variables were used, the games from 1990 were not used so the 
estimation had 14,278 observations. 
We identify quality in two different ways: Method 1: We estimate the expected margin of 
victory for each game based on a weighted average of past performance measured by win 
percentage and the strength of schedule for each team. A team’s strength of schedule is the 
average winning percentage of a team’s opponents up to the date of the game. Therefore, this 
non-linear estimation takes into account where the game is played (home, away, or neutral), 
the winning percentage of each team for the current and previous year, and the strength of 
schedule for each team for the current and previous year. The weighting between the current 
and previous year depends on how many games the teams have played in the current season. 
The equation is given by, 
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where MOV is the margin of victory for the home team, Neutral is equal to one if the game is 
on a neutral field, NH is the n
th game of the season for the home team, NA is the n
th game of 
the away team, win% is the winning percentage, SOS is the strength of schedule5 , h 
represents the home team, a represents the away team, t is the season, and N  denotes that the 
winning percentage or strength of schedule is calculated at the end of the previous season. 
Table 2 gives the parameter estimates and t-statistics, the model correctly predicts 73% of 
games. 
This model was then used to create a quality metric for every team for each game. A team’s 
quality value was computed using the parameter estimates from equation (1) in addition to 
their winning percentages for this year and the previous year, as well as the strength of 
schedule for both years. Home team parameter estimates were used, but since there is no road 
team identified a value of .5 was used for the visiting team’s winning percentage and strength 
of schedule. So, this measure represents the expected margin of victory against a .500 team, 
so that the metric for team i during season t for the thiN  game is given by, 
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*
, , Hi t NMOV  was then used as a quality metric for the home team, MOVH, and the away team, 
MOVA. A constant was then added to ensure that MOVH > 0 and MOVA > 0. 
Method 2: We also construct an ELO rating for each team.6 ELO ratings are widely used in 
competitions where the organizers want to match competitors of similar ability, most notably 
in chess. An ELO rating is built up by playing games, where the result of each game 
generates an addition or subtraction depending on win or loss, where the size of the 
adjustment is calibrated according to the pre-match expectation of the outcome, which is 
based on the ELO ratings going into the game. For each competitor the initial value is 
arbitrary, but once enough games have been played ELO ratings provide a consistent measure 
of relative performance. Thus for each game the expectation of a win for team i against team j 
is 
( )/400
1
1 10 i j
ij ELO ELOE −= +
 (3) 
And the rating is updated according to 
( )'  = + −i i ij ijELO ELO K R E  (4) 
Where R is the result (win = 1, loss = 0) and K is a scaling factor. There is some controversy 
over the appropriate value of the scaling factor, but we chose the commonly used value of 50. 
However, we do not believe this significantly affects the estimation of our demand model. To 
construct the ELO ratings we used results dating back 20 years so that even our earliest 
demand observations are based on around ten years of results. 
3.2 Attendance Estimation 
We collected attendance data from various sources for 4839 college football games played 
between 2001 and 2010. However, we do not have attendance for all Football Bowl 
Subdivision games over this time period. Attendance data is more readily available for recent 
games. For example, we have 245 observations in 2001, but 729 in 2010.7 
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We now use our alternative measures of quality to estimate demand. Our hypothesis is that 
attendance is a function of both home and away team quality. As well as team quality we 
assume that demand is a function of year and stadium fixed effects and monthly dummies. 
We also allow for the effect of “rivalry” games. Clearly the definition of a rivalry game is 
somewhat arbitrary, but we want to capture the possibility that certain games may add to 
demand even if the quality of the teams is poor. We suspect that Michigan v Ohio State 
would sell out no matter who played for the teams. To capture rivalry effects we invited six 
colleagues to choose from a list of all match-ups from the last 20 years (2769) and indicate 
which match-ups they thought were true ”rivalry” games. Only about 15% of these games 
have been played more than 15 times, whereas one might expect true rivalry games would be 
played almost every year. We decided to designate match-ups as rivalry games if two thirds 
or more (at least 4 of 6) of our assessors thought that they were. This generated a total of 31 
rivalry games, which are listed in Table 3. Table 4 has summary statistics of the data used to 
estimate attendance. 
Although we do not have data on prices, these are likely to be captured by the combination of 
stadium fixed effect and year dummies. A number of stadiums sell out on a regular basis and 
so we use Tobit as well as OLS to estimate demand. Ideally we would like to know the exact 
stadium capacity at each game, since this can vary significantly for a number of reasons. 
There are differences in how teams report attendance and stadium capacity can vary for each 
team from year to year or even game to game. 
We estimate the following demand model 
*
0 1 2 3 4:8 9 10:20 21:145
H A HA month rival yr stad
i i i i i i i i iy X X X X X X X= β + β + β + β + β + β + β + β +   (5) 
where *iy  is the attendance data and we observe *i iy y=  only if the attendance is not censored. 
In order for a game to be denoted as censored (sold-out), it met three criteria. First, the 
attendance had to be least 98% of the maximum attendance value for that stadium. Second, 
there had to be at least two games that were 98% or more of the maximum attendance value 
for the stadium. Third, at least one-tenth of the games in the stadium in the sample had to be 
at least 98% of the maximum value of the stadium.8 Therefore, the threshold for a sell-out 
varied by team. Teams with larger stadiums needed a higher attendance to be considered a 
sell-out when compared with teams with smaller stadiums. These criteria resulted in 16.3% of 
games being denoted as a sell-out, after Notre Dame was thrown out of the sample since all 
of their games qualified as a sell-out. 
H
iX  represents the strength of the home team (either MOV or ELO), AiX  is strength of the 
away team, HAiX  is the interaction of the strength of the home and away teams, monthiX  
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represents month dummy variables, rivaliX  is a dummy variable for rivalry games, yriX  
represents year dummy variables, stadiX  represents stadium dummy variables, and õ i is the 
error term. 
4 Results 
The demand estimation results are presented in Table 5. Using both measures (MOV and 
ELO), we ran an OLS on the full sample, and OLS using only teams without censored 
observations9 , a Censored Least Absolute Deviation (CLAD) model as described in Powell 
(1984), and a Tobit model. Both our MOV and our ELO measures of quality show that the 
strength of the home team and the strength of the away team add significantly to demand, as 
one might expect. The interaction of the home and away quality measures, which can be 
interpreted as the effect of competitive balance on demand, is insignificant in the full sample 
OLS and CLAD estimations but significant and with the expected sign in the sub-sample 
OLS and Tobit estimations. One interpretation of this is that the teams with capacity 
constraints are generally the stronger teams who have big rivals but also have a habit of 
scheduling very weak teams from time to time. If capacity constraints are not allowed for, 
then it might appear that playing minnows does not reduce demand, but once capacity 
constraints are included the effect of the competitive imbalance becomes apparent. Our 
rivalry measure is also strongly significant and adds significantly to demand. 
5 Schedule Simulations 
5.1 Random Schedule 
Based on this analysis we are able to construct simulated schedules for the 2010 season and 
estimated the demand that would be associated with these alternative schedules. First, we 
compared the actual schedule to a random schedule. 100 simulations were run where each 
week the visiting teams were randomly assigned one of the home teams, and so the number 
of home games and total number of games did not change for teams. The results in Table 10 
are the averages from the 100 simulations, and we discuss these below. 
5.2 Stratified Schedules 
Next, we simulated a stratified schedule based on the quality measures for the teams. We 
report four schedules (conference realignments) based on (a) each quality measure (MOV and 
ELO) and (b) one year’s quality measures (2010) or a ten year average quality measure. 
For each schedule we ranked the teams from 1 to 118. The teams are ranked based either on 
their quality at the beginning of the 2010 season or their average quality at the beginning of 
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the season for the previous 10 years (2001-2010). We then put the top 13 teams in the first 
conference, the next 13 teams in the next conference, and so on. We then gave each team a 12 
game schedule, 6 home games and 6 road games with the other 12 teams in the conference. 
Therefore, each team’s entire schedule is with other team’s within the conference. Each 
team’s schedule is balanced in the sense that if they play the best team at home, they play the 
next best team on the road, the next team at home, and so on. This mandates that each team 
plays one-half of their games at home and one-half of their games away. This balanced 
scheduling process generates a slightly smaller number of games than are currently played in 
a season. 
Recall that demand in our model is determined by quality, which is in turn determined by 
performance results. For the simulation we need to update quality throughout the season. We 
did this by assuming that each team’s quality measure is updated throughout the season in the 
way that the measures actually did change in 2010. For example, for a team’s third road 
game, their quality measure was the same as that team’s quality measure when they played 
their third game in 2010. If a team did not have 6 home games, or 6 road games, their last 
home/road quality measure was used.10 Unfortunately, with 118 teams, there is one team left 
over after teams have been assigned to 9 conferences. In the simulation, this team plays a 
generic Football Championship Subdivision team for each game. 
The four proposed conferences are shown in Tables 6-9. Tables 6 and 7 are based only on 
quality as measured in 2010, tables 8 and 9 are based on average quality measured between 
2001 and 2010. Tables 6 and 8 are calculated on the basis of the MOV measure, tables 7 and 
9 on the basis of the ELO measure. 
These schedules are optimal in the sense that the best teams (based on the relevant quality 
measure) are playing the best teams, which increases demand for college football. However, 
this does cause a decrease in rivalry games, which is a major complaint about conference 
realignment. Another factor that can decrease overall attendance is that each team has 6 home 
games and 6 road games. Currently, teams with high demand typically have more home 
games than road games, thereby increasing aggregate attendance. 
Table 10 shows the results from the various schedules. The first row in Table 10 shows that 
our stratified schedule does have fewer games, due to the fact that this schedule is balanced. 
The second row shows the average per game attendance for teams. It is important to note that 
these numbers are an average of the average attendance for each team. The results show that 
a completely random schedule is just slightly worse (by between 1/3% and 1/2% on average) 
than the current conference scheduling. The random schedule by definition does not give 
priority to rivalry games, suggesting that the rivalry effect is not especially strong. The 
impacts are relatively small, which gives some evidence that the number of out of conference 
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games creates schedules that are not that far different, in terms of strength of schedule, from a 
completely random schedule. Also it is important to note that while this simulation randomly 
assigned visiting teams, the home teams were the same as the actual home teams in 2010, and 
these home teams tended to be the ones with the larger stadiums. If we had randomly 
assigned home field advantage as well, then the average stadium size would have been 
smaller and so this random schedule would have had yet lower attendance. 
By contrast, the stratified schedule which matches teams of roughly equal strength (and also 
has fewer rivalry games), increases the average per game attendance between 1% and 2%. 
This increase is due to the interaction between home and road team qualities. 
The fourth row shows the total attendance for the year. Since there are 3.85% fewer games in 
our stratified simulations we multiply the stratified attendance total by 1.0385. This is 
equivalent to assuming that each team played 6.23 home games so that there were 729 games 
total. In our stratified simulation each team plays the same number of home games. Under 
this scenario, total attendance actually drops roughly 3%. This is because any increase in 
demand from scheduling more evenly ranked teams is more than offset by the fact that teams 
that generally have a high attendance are forced to have fewer home games. 
For example, the biggest beneficiary of moving to a stratified schedule based on a 10 year 
average is Navy. Using the MOV metric, their per game attendance would go from 33,952 to 
35,456 and the number of home games goes from 5 to 6.23. Therefore their total attendance 
would go from 169,759 to 220,921 for a gain of 51,162. Most of this gain is due to the 
increase in the number of home games instead of the increase in per game attendance. The 
biggest drop in attendance would happen to Ohio St. While their per game attendance goes 
from 113,611 to 115,614, their number of home games would go from 8 to 6.23. Therefore, 
their total attendance would go from 908,889 to 720,361, which is a drop of 188,528. 
If the goal of the NCAA was to continue having balanced conferences, then the conferences 
would need to be realigned periodically, presumably yearly. We note that changes in 
conference realignment would be less dramatic if they used quality measures that were 
averaged over the previous 10 seasons. 
6 Costs of Realignment 
The realignment simulated here would create a hierarchy of divisions containing equally 
matched teams, and thus resembles the structure of professional soccer leagues in Europe. 
There teams play in hierarchically organized divisions linked by the promotion and relegation 
rule. This requires that the worst performing teams, measured by success on the field, are 
relegated at the end of the season to the immediately inferior division, to be replaced for the 
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following season by the best performing teams from that division. Teams can and do move up 
and down the hierarchy depending on the quality of their play. 
Our simulation shows that this realignment would lead to lower attendance, mainly due to the 
fact that the higher quality teams with larger stadiums would play fewer games at home. 
While there is a loss of rivalry games, the main cost is the change in home games for teams 
with large stadiums. 4.4% of the games in our sample are considered rivalry games and our 
largest estimates of the impact of those games is a 12.6% increase in attendance. Therefore, 
we estimate rivalry games to account for .56% or less of total attendance. Capacity effects 
from balanced schedules, on the other hand, can decrease aggregate attendance 4%. 
However, this effect might only be short term. Given that demand should increase for each 
team, (because the matching effect generates more attractive games) then all teams might 
increase capacity in the longer run to meet increased demand. We did not find a strong rivalry 
game effect, and even if demand was reduced somewhat by the loss of rivalry games, the 
results imply that it might not be too difficult to generate new rivalry games. In any case, the 
realignment was intended solely to maximize assortative matching, but it is possible to 
generate alternative models which improves the balance of matches while preserving more 
rivalry games.11 It also seems plausible that the greatest benefit of increasing balance in 
competition might not be increased attendance at the stadium but increased media interest. 
However, there are other costs involved with realignment. Given that the current conferences 
are largely based on geography, making conferences more performance based would increase 
travel costs since teams would be further away. These travel costs are not only of the form of 
direct financial costs, but might also include a reduced willingness of visiting fans to attend 
games, which would thereby reduce attendance.12 A related point is that this may cause 
problems with other college sports. Many of the current conferences embrace all sports and 
hence a realignment based on college football might drastically increase travel costs for 
Athletic Departments. 
There could be adverse effects due to the fact that conferences would change. While our 
model attempts to control for rivalry games, there may be a positive effect on demand from 
maintaining conference stability over a long time period. Also, if it turned out that there was 
little long term mobility up and down the hierarchy then schools that were perpetually at the 
bottom might lose demand because of the lost opportunity to play occasional games against 
highly ranked teams. 
7 Conclusions 
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In this paper we have simulated an optimal league structure for college football derived from 
our estimates of team quality (based on results) and the empirical relationship between 
attendance and the quality of the home and away teams. We find that the restructuring would 
yield a small increase in attendance. We do not find that the loss of rivalry games due to 
restructuring would lead to significantly adverse effects on attendance. It is commonplace in 
sports competition to match contestants of similar ability. In a league format, players of 
similar ability are usually classed together although there may be some opportunities to move 
between classes (in knock-out competition organizers usually prefer to seed players so that 
the best do not meet in the early rounds). Arguably this matching occurs because people like 
to see the best play against the best. 
Sports economics has tended to focus on the competitive balance hypothesis that demand 
increases when opponents are equally balanced. This entails the proposition that the best 
playing against the best (as well as the worst playing against the worst) is more attractive than 
contests among teams of unequal abilities. 
In many contexts it has proved hard to demonstrate clear support for the competitive balance 
hypothesis, perhaps because leagues often tend to be relatively well balanced. It may be that 
the disparities in some college football games are great enough to reveal the competitive 
balance effect. Indeed, we know that strong teams often choose to play against very weak 
opponents, and our analysis shows that this comes at a cost in terms attractiveness to fans, 
even if our simulations suggest that there are offsetting benefits within the current system. 
The competitive balance hypothesis has been used as an argument in favor of redistribution 
among teams that are already members of a league. In the college football context, where 
teams have discretion to choose who they play during the season, the implications are rather 
different. It is not surprising that teams have incentives to pick very weak opponents, all else 
equal. There are benefits in terms preparing players for stronger opponents ahead, and also in 
terms of creating an aura of invincibility (even if this is not always entirely credible). 
Were the NCAA free to design the entire conference system from scratch, then we suppose 
they would pick a structure along the lines we have identified. More interestingly, will 
realignments driven by individual choice lead ultimately to balanced divisional structure of 
the type we have simulated? There are reasons to think that they will, given that strong teams 
potentially gain revenues when they commit to playing more games against other strong 
teams, and there are clear benefits to be seen to be playing at the highest level. We believe 
that conference realignments are evidence of this process at work. That said this process 
could take decades or more complete. 
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Finally, we draw a parallel between this problem and the issues facing European soccer 
competition. In Europe teams are traditionally organized in national leagues, but the most 
attractive competition format is generally thought to be UEFA Champions League, where 
teams from different countries play each other. The problem with this system is that the top 
teams in different countries (e.g. Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Manchester United or AC 
Milan) seldom get to play each other. For many years now there have been discussions about 
the creation of a European ”Superleague” - and although this has not materialized existing 
competitions have been reformed to enable the top clubs from different countries to play each 
other more often than in the past. In our view, that is because fans typically want to see the 
best play against the best. 
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Table 1 Previous Studies 
Paper sport Price? UOHmeasur
e 
Sign Significant 
DeSchriver & 
Jensen (2002) 
College 
football 
Yes (+, sig) Homewpcbyse
asonquarter 
+ Yes, mostly in 
Q4 
Price & Sen 
(2003) 
College 
football 
Yes (-, sig) Homewpc + Yes 
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   Awaywpc + Yes 
   Diffwpc2 - No 
Paul, 
Humphreys & 
College 
football 
No Homewin%, + Yes 
Weinbach 
(2012) 
  pointsspread, + Yes 
   under/over + Yes 
Groza (2010) College 
football 
No HomeWpc + Yes 
   Sagarinrating + Yes 
   Diffsag2 - Yes 
Coates & 
Humphreys 
(2010) 
NFL No Homewpc + Yes 
   Awaywpc + Yes 
   |Pointsspread
| 
+ Yes 
   |Pointsspread
2| 
- Yes 
   |Pointsspread 
* 
homeunderdo
g| 
- Yes 
Meehan 
Nelson & 
MLB Yes (+, sig) Homewpc + Yes 
Richardson 
(2007) 
  HomeGBdivlea
der 
- Yes 
   AwayGBdivlea
der 
- Yes 
   Wpcdiffabsolu
te 
- Yes 
   Wpcdiff + - Yes 
   Wpcdiff − + Yes 
Lemke, 
Leonard & 
MLB Yes (+, sig) Homewinprob - Marg 
Tlhokwane 
(2009) 
  Homewinprob
2 
+ Marg 
   Playoffchance
s 
various Marg 
Davis (2009) NL No Homewpc > .5 + yes 
Coates & 
Humphreys 
(2011) 
NHL No Probhomewin + Yes, if > .584 
   Homewpc - No 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
   Awaywpc + Yes 
Rascher & 
Solmes (2007) 
NBA Yes(-, NS) (i)Wpchome + No 
   Wpchome2 + No 
   Wpcaway + No 
   Wpcaway2 + No 
   Diffinwpc - No 
   Diffinwpc2 - No 
   (ii)Homewinpr
ob 
+ Yes 
   Homewinprob
2 
- Yes 
Simmons & 
Buraimo 
(2008) 
EPL No Homeptsperga
me 
+ Yes 
   Awayptsperga
me 
+ Yes 
   Theilmeasure - Yes 
   Probhomewin - Yes 
   Probhomewin2 + Yes 
Forrest et al. 
(2005) 
Eng. Foot. Lea. No Homepointspe
rgame 
+ Yes 
 (3 division)  Awaypointspe
rgame 
- No 
   Probratio - Yes 
   Probratio2 + Yes 
Forrest & 
Simmons 
(2006) 
FLC No Homepoints + Yes 
   Awaypoints + Yes 
   Hometeamho
meform 
+ Yes 
   Points/gamedi
fferenceadjust
ed 
? No 
Buraimo, 
Forrest, 
FLC No Homeptsperga
me 
+ Yes 
& Simmons 
(2009) 
  Awayptsperga
me 
+ Yes 
Benz et al 
(2009) 
Bundesliga Yes (-, NS) Diffinleaguepo
s 
- No 
   Diffinptsperga
me 
- No 
   Theil - No 
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   Relativewinpr
ob 
- No 
   Probhomewin + No 
   Probhomewin2 + No 
      
 
Table 2 Estimation of Margin of Victory13 
Variable Estimate t-statistic 
β1 6.575*** 4.17 
β2 -3.331*** -5.59 
β3 48.663*** 26.86 
β4 39.167*** 29.85 
β5 26.409*** 10.64 
β6 71.260*** 23.86 
β7 -54.304*** -28.09 
β8 -39.496*** -29.21 
β9 -29.737*** -14.31 
β10 -70.739*** -24.08 
β11 0.345*** 19.32 
N 14278  
R2 .37  
% of games predicted correctly .73  
 
Table 3 List of Rivalry Games 
Air Force Army 
Air Force Navy 
Alabama Auburn 
Alabama LSU 
Arizona Arizona State 
Army Navy 
California Stanford 
Duke North Carolina 
Florida Georgia 
Florida Florida State 
Florida State Miami 
Georgia Georgia Tech 
Indiana Purdue 
Iowa Iowa State 
Kansas Kansas State 
Kansas Missouri 
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Michigan Michigan State 
Michigan Notre Dame 
Michigan Ohio State 
Mississippi State Ole Miss 
Notre Dame Stanford 
Notre Dame USC 
Oklahoma Oklahoma State 
Oklahoma Texas 
Oregon Oregon State 
Pittsburgh West Virginia 
Texas Texas A&M 
UCLA USC 
Utah Utah State 
Virginia Virginia Tech 
Washington Washington State 
 
Table 4 Summary Statistics for Attendance Estimation 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Attendance 53092 26835 113090 1535 
MOVH 26.822 9.227 49.088 0.068 
MOVA 47.026 10.200 71.732 0 
ELOH 1.092 0.229 1.620 0.452 
ELOA 0.962 0.281 1.590 0.304 
Sep 0.355 0.478 1 0 
Oct 0.315 0.465 1 0 
Nov 0.285 0.451 1 0 
Dec 0.018 0.131 1 0 
Rival 0.044 0.206 1 0 
2001 0.051 0.219 1 0 
2002 0.063 0.243 1 0 
2003 0.059 0.236 1 0 
2004 0.061 0.240 1 0 
2005 0.070 0.255 1 0 
2006 0.095 0.294 1 0 
2007 0.111 0.315 1 0 
2008 0.143 0.350 1 0 
2009 0.151 0.358 1 0 
2010 0.151 0.358 1 0 
 
Table 5 Attendance Estimation (year and stadium fixed effects not shown) 1415 
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 OLS OLS 
sub 
CLAD Tobit OLS OLS 
sub 
CLAD Tobit 
MOVH 283*** 115* 252*** 191***     
 (6.64) (1.91) (4.01) (5.56)     
MOVA 114*** 33.4 73.2** 60.1**     
 (4.61) (1.04) (2.02) (2.43)     
MOVH * 
MOVA 
0.891 5.24*** 1.84 4.1***     
 (1.04) (4.23) (1.41) (3.00)     
ELOH     21264**
* 
16456**
* 
18908**
* 
19714**
* 
     (13.79) (7.51) (12.05) (7.90) 
ELOA     7263*** 251 4039** 2679 
     (4.78) (0.12) (2.20) (1.23) 
ELOH * 
ELOA 
    -816 7074*** 1960 4733** 
     (-0.60) (3.56) (1.18) (2.18) 
Sep -119 -1104 157 264 -479 -1606** -337 -149 
 (-0.24) (-1.53) (0.32) (0.48) (-1.00) (-2.27) (-0.74) (-0.19) 
Oct -265 -1781** 102 36.1 -
1304*** 
-
3003*** 
-1151** -1230 
 (-0.54) (-2.45) (0.22) (0.06) (-2.68) (-4.19) (-2.49) (-1.40) 
Nov -947* -
3017*** 
-806* -657 -
2328*** 
-
4599*** 
-
2445*** 
-
2336*** 
 (-1.93) (-4.15) (-1.67) (-1.46) (-4.77) (-6.39) (-5.11) (-2.85) 
Dec 599 -714 -449 739 -892 -2390** -1340 -1046 
 (0.79) (-0.65) (-0.51) (0.80) (-1.19) (-2.22) (-1.14) (-0.87) 
Rivals 4600*** 6707*** 6600*** 6114*** 4345*** 6097*** 5796*** 5689*** 
 (11.71) (11.23) (6.14) (9.58) (11.20) (10.38) (4.77) (8.53) 
         
R2 0.963 0.933   0.964 0.935   
Log 
Likelihoo
d 
   41197    41114 
N 4839 2771 4839 4839 4839 2771 4839 4839 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Table 6 Conference alignment from MOV variable for 2010 season16 
Conference 1 Conference 2 Conference 3 
Texas Arizona Arkansas 
Alabama Oregon State Utah 
Cincinnati LSU UCLA 
Boise State BYU Oklahoma State 
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Florida Penn State Bowling Green 
Pittsburgh Georgia Tech Clemson 
Wisconsin Navy Minnesota 
Ohio State Nebraska Central Michigan 
Iowa North Carolina Auburn 
Oregon Miami Georgia 
TCU Missouri Florida State 
Virginia Tech West Virginia Kentucky 
USC Oklahoma SMU 
Conference 4 Conference 5 Conference 6 
Washington Syracuse Middle Tennessee 
Troy Rutgers Idaho 
Mississippi State Stanford Northern Illinois 
Marshall Boston College Louisiana Lafayette 
Texas Tech Fresno State Utah State 
South Carolina South Florida Ohio 
Tennessee UCF Iowa State 
East Carolina Nevada Louisiana Monroe 
Purdue Notre Dame Texas A&M 
Air Force California Temple 
Ole Miss Southern Miss Florida Atlantic 
Northwestern Michigan State Louisville 
Houston Wyoming Baylor 
Conference 7 Conference 8 Conference 9 
Kansas San Jose State Western Michigan 
Tulsa NC State Toledo 
UNLV Memphis Duke 
Kansas State Arizona State North Texas 
Wake Forest Louisiana Tech Tulane 
Colorado State Washington State Vanderbilt 
Miami (OH) Illinois UTEP 
UAB Virginia Rice 
Hawaii Army Kent State 
Michigan Indiana Maryland 
Buffalo San Diego State New Mexico State 
Colorado Florida International Western Kentucky 
Arkansas State New Mexico Ball State 
 
Table 7 Conference alignment from ELO variable for 2010 season17 
Conference 1 Conference 2 Conference 3 
Florida TCU Boston College 
Texas Georgia Tech Clemson 
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Alabama Utah Auburn 
Ohio State BYU Pittsburgh 
USC Texas Tech Miami 
Oregon Iowa Arkansas 
Penn State Oregon State Arizona 
Boise State Nebraska Missouri 
Virginia Tech West Virginia Ole Miss 
Oklahoma Wisconsin Tennessee 
Georgia Florida State Stanford 
Cincinnati California South Carolina 
LSU Oklahoma State Rutgers 
Conference 4 Conference 5 Conference 6 
North Carolina NC State Maryland 
Michigan State Mississippi State Troy 
Northwestern Air Force Washington 
Kentucky Texas A&M Hawaii 
UCLA Michigan Colorado 
South Florida Purdue UCF 
Kansas Kansas State Illinois 
Wake Forest Houston Iowa State 
Notre Dame Fresno State Middle Tennessee 
Navy Virginia Wyoming 
East Carolina Nevada Southern Miss 
Central Michigan Minnesota Baylor 
Arizona State Louisville Tulsa 
Conference 7 Conference 8 Conference 9 
Vanderbilt Rice UTEP 
Indiana SMU San Jose State 
Syracuse Northern Illinois Arkansas State 
Bowling Green Colorado State Utah State 
Washington State UAB Memphis 
Temple Idaho Kent State 
UNLV Louisiana Lafayette Army 
Ohio New Mexico Florida International 
Marshall Louisiana Monroe Tulane 
Duke Buffalo New Mexico State 
Louisiana Tech Ball State Miami (OH) 
Florida Atlantic San Diego State Eastern Michigan 
Western Michigan Toledo North Texas 
 
Table 8 Conference alignment from average MOV variable from 2001 to 2010 season18 
Conference 1 Conference 2 Conference 3 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
USC Tennessee Iowa 
Oklahoma Auburn Louisville 
Texas Oregon State UCLA 
Florida West Virginia Oklahoma State 
LSU Michigan South Carolina 
Ohio State Alabama Arkansas 
Miami Boston College Cincinnati 
Florida State Wisconsin Clemson 
Georgia Texas Tech Penn State 
Virginia Tech Notre Dame Maryland 
Boise State Georgia Tech Pittsburgh 
Oregon Nebraska California 
TCU Utah BYU 
Conference 4 Conference 5 Conference 6 
Fresno State Bowling Green Arizona 
Texas A&M Washington Northern Illinois 
Colorado South Florida NC State 
Virginia Colorado State Kentucky 
Southern Miss Michigan State Air Force 
Purdue Arizona State Troy 
Kansas State North Carolina Illinois 
Minnesota Syracuse New Mexico 
Wake Forest Stanford Kansas 
Northwestern Toledo Nevada 
Missouri Marshall Miami (OH) 
Ole Miss Hawaii Houston 
Washington State East Carolina Western Michigan 
Conference 7 Conference 8 Conference 9 
Rutgers Ball State Tulane 
Tulsa North Texas Arkansas State 
UCF UTEP Western Kentucky 
Mississippi State UNLV SMU 
Iowa State Rice Louisiana Lafayette 
Central Michigan Utah State New Mexico State 
Middle Tennessee San Jose State Idaho 
Baylor Vanderbilt Kent State 
Louisiana Tech Indiana Louisiana Monroe 
UAB Ohio Duke 
Memphis San Diego State Buffalo 
Navy Wyoming Army 
Florida Atlantic Temple Florida International 
 
Table 9 Conference alignment from ELO variable from 2001 to 2010 season19 
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Conference 1 Conference 2 Conference 3 
Texas Oregon Iowa 
Florida Nebraska Arkansas 
USC Wisconsin Kansas State 
Oklahoma Penn State UCLA 
Ohio State Oregon State Utah 
Georgia Boston College Virginia 
LSU Texas Tech California 
Miami Alabama Maryland 
Florida State Georgia Tech TCU 
Virginia Tech Boise State Purdue 
Tennessee Clemson Louisville 
Michigan West Virginia Texas A&M 
Auburn Notre Dame Arizona State 
Conference 4 Conference 5 Conference 6 
South Carolina Arizona Colorado State 
Colorado Minnesota Marshall 
BYU Cincinnati Mississippi State 
NC State North Carolina Air Force 
Michigan State South Florida Illinois 
Pittsburgh Fresno State Toledo 
Missouri Northwestern New Mexico 
Washington State Southern Miss East Carolina 
Oklahoma State Kansas Troy 
Ole Miss Hawaii Bowling Green 
Washington Iowa State Indiana 
Stanford Kentucky Miami (OH) 
Wake Forest Syracuse Houston 
Conference 7 Conference 8 Conference 9 
Rutgers Baylor Duke 
Northern Illinois Tulsa SMU 
Navy UNLV North Texas 
UCF Middle Tennessee Utah State 
Nevada Rice Florida International 
Louisiana Tech Tulane Louisiana Lafayette 
Memphis Central Michigan Arkansas State 
Vanderbilt San Jose State New Mexico State 
San Diego State Ball State Louisiana Monroe 
Florida Atlantic Ohio Kent State 
Wyoming UTEP Idaho 
UAB Western Kentucky Army 
Western Michigan Temple Eastern Michigan 
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Table 10 Unrestricted Attendance Estimation From Simulation Results20 
Schedul
e 
        
Estimati
on 
acutal  random  stratified  10 year 
avg. 
 
 MOV ELO MOV ELO MOV ELO MOV ELO 
# of 
games20 
729 729 729 729 708 708 708 708 
average         
per 
game 
        
attenda
nce 
44,850 44,919 44,639 44,749 45,359 45,694 45,319 45,638 
% from         
actual   -.47% -.38% 1.14% 1.72% 1.05% 1.60% 
total         
attenda
nce 
34,103,8
71 
34,155,6
70 
33,921,0
20 
33,986,6
60 
33,066,6
22 
33,311,0
03 
33,037,3
68 
33,270,3
17 
% from         
actual   -.54% -.49% -3.04% -2.47% -3.13% -2.59% 
 
                                                            
1  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_schools_changing_conference_in_the_2010%E2%80%9313_NCAA_confer
ence_realignmentuploaded 6/6/2013 
2  For example, consider scheduling games one weekend for Michigan (capacity 108,000), Ohio State (105,000), 
Eastern Michigan (30,000) and Bowling Green (24,000). Assume that team quality is correlated with stadium 
capacity. Then with positive assortative matching Ohio State plays at Michigan and Bowling Green plays at 
Eastern Michigan, and if the games are sold out then the total number of tickets sold is 138,000. Now suppose 
Eastern Michigan plays at Michigan and Bowling Green at Ohio State, and that due to the lack of positive 
assortative matching demand is only 75% of capacity. The total number of tickets sold will now be 160,000. 
3  Mongeon and Winfree (2012) find that in the National Basketball Association, television audiences are 4.5 
times more sensitive to winning than live audiences. 
4  Fort and Winfree (2013, p33) point out that research has found a positive correlation between college 
athletic success and alumni giving (Rhoads and Gerking (2000)), student applications (e.g. Pope and Pope 
(2009)) and budget allocations by legislators (Humphreys (2006)). 
5  SOS is equal to the average winning percentage of the opponents that the team has played up until that 
game. 
6  See Elo (1978) for an explanation of the ranking method. Elo ratings have been used for ranking in a number 
of different sports. See e.g. Hvattum and Artnzen (2010) for an application to soccer. 
7  This does not include Notre Dame because all of their games were censored due to sell outs according to our 
criteria, explained later in the paper. 
8  If less than 10% of games were greater than 98% of the maximum, the censoring issue was not deemed to be 
severe at that stadium and there is a greater probability that the games are uncensored and randomly within 
2% of the maximum. 
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9  With both OLS estimations, we do not account for censoring and assume *i iy y= . 
10  While it might seem arbitrary to assume that quality would evolve in our league structure in the same way 
that it did in the actual competition structure in 2010, it seems reasonable to suggest, at least as an 
approximation, that the quality of a team is independent of the opposing teams. In other words, if the 
schedule had been different the game scores would have been different, but these should have implied the 
same quality estimates. 
11  In recent years, there has been some movement of teams across various conferences. Perhaps conferences 
recognize the value of admitting teams of similar quality, but at the same time maintain rivalry games and 
allow the larger teams to schedule more home. 
12  In Europe the soccer leagues operate within national boundaries and so travel costs do not tend to be 
important. 
13 *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
14  ”OLS sub” refers to OLS estimates using only teams that have no censored observations 
15 Standard errors for the CLAD estimation was calculted using a bootstrap with 200 replications. 
16 Teams in italics maintained a rivaly game with this conference alignment. Stanford maintained 2 rivalry 
games. Eastern Michigan was the last ranked team and played Football Championship Subdivision teams in the 
simulation. 
17 Teams in italics maintained a rivaly game with this conference alignment. Western Kentucky was the last 
ranked team and played Football Championship Subdivision teams in the simulation. 
18 Teams in italics maintained a rivaly game with this conference alignment. Florida and Florida St. maintained 
2 rivalry games. Eastern Michigan was the last ranked team and played Football Championship Subdivision 
teams in the simulation. 
19 Teams in italics maintained a rivaly game with this conference alignment. Florida and Florida St. maintained 
2 rivalry games. Buffalo was the last ranked team and played Football Championship Subdivision teams in the 
simulation. 
20 Due to the unbalanced schedule, there were a total of 729 home games in the sample. The random 
simulation only changed opponents and not the dates of home games, therefore there are also 729 home 
games. The stratified and 10 year average simulations use six home games for each team and therefore there 
are 702 games in total. However, to find the season’s total attendance, each teams average attendance was 
multiplied by 6.23 to make the comparisons more meaningful. 
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